All of this is accomplished in a fine, in fact an enviable, writing style. Quine's philosophy beginning with the rejection of conventionalism, the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, and the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this book Edward Becker sets out to interpret and explain these doctrines. Scanlon and Anthony Appiah Striking new text design to help locate key entries quickly and easily An outstanding guide to all things philosophical, The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides an unrivalled introduction to the subject for students and general readers alike. I have raised three main problems -- the first about Becker's interpretation of Quine's view of truth by convention, the second about Becker's attempt to explain analyticity, and the third about his argument that we cannot occupy a point of view from which we describe the references of our own words as inscrutable.
If not as I believe , then why does Quine speak of truth by convention here? I shall not discuss these extensions here. The book will be of especial value to Quine enthusiasts and critics as well as a wider audience of philosophers and scholars. He also proposes a new version of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, and a new way of rehabilitating analyticity. A person who wishes to answer Quine's criticisms of the notion of analyticity would not want to conclude from this derivation of 6 that 'Rabbits hop' is analytic. Lee ed , Philosophical Essays for A. Decock shows that the interplay between ontology and ideology is far more complicated and interesting than has generally been assumed.
As I shall try to show by discussing a few of Becker's interpretations of Quine, however, the strategy is not well-suited to uncovering Quine's deepest philosophical commitments. We can take our words at face value in this non-semantic sense while simultaneously affirming a non-disquotational account of reference for them. Unlike many other Quine interpreters, including Richard Creath, Michael Friedman, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Hylton, Alan Richardson, and Thomas Ricketts, Becker does not look for interpretive clues in Quine's letters and unpublished lectures, or interpret Quine in light of evidence of his intellectual debts to Rudolf Carnap. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap,Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make cleartechnical philosophical concepts Includes listings of suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes littleprevious knowledge of philosophy Category: Philosophy. Becker concludes that 'If rabbits hop, then rabbits hop' is analytic -- true in virtue of the meanings of its words Becker, p. See, for instance, Quine 1953, Quine 1960, p.
It would seem that, in order to see that the inscrutability applies to ourselves, we would have to achieve a God-like perspective that was independent of any language or theory. Features coverage of all the major subject areasand figures in analytic philosophy - includingWittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G. The primary problem with his account, however, is not that it fails to justify truth-functional logical truths, but that it does not explain what distinguishes them from such widely-accepted truths as 5 , which no defender of analyticity would classify as analytic. Carnap, Rudolf 1937: The Logical Syntax of Language. Quine's philosophy beginning with the rejection of conventionalism, the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, and the analytic-synthetic distinction. All of this is accomplished in a fine, in fact an enviable, writing style. This book will be invaluable for students of Quine, and for anyone interested in the further development of the Quinean themes Becker so ably expounds.
The contributors have addressed both current and past scholarship on world philosophy and religion and have produced a worthy successor to Macmillan's 1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The argument has prompted some commentators including Grice and Strawson 1956 to complain that holism of theory testing is compatible with analyticity. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index. Quine's work, Edward Becker aims to explain and evaluate Quine's arguments for four conclusions that are integral to his philosophy: logic is not true by convention, there is no epistemologically significant analytic-synthetic distinction, translation is indeterminate, and ontology is relative. To take one's words at face value, for Quine, is simply to use the words. This strategy has the great merit of focusing the reader's attention on the details of Quine's carefully crafted texts.
Anyone with a serious interest in understanding Quine should read it. Willard Van Orman Quine's work revolutionized the fields of epistemology, semantics and ontology. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. New York: Columbia University Press. Hence 1 truth-functionally implies its left-hand side, namely, 3 'If rabbits hop, then rabbits hop' is true in English. This book will be invaluable for students of Quine, and for anyone interested in the further development of the Quinean themes Becker so ably expounds. Becker also extends the account to cover quantificational logical truths and definitional truths Becker, pp.
In addition, as just noted, a typical English speaker will readily affirm 5 Rabbits hop. This difference does not explain why 'If rabbits hop, then rabbits hop' is analytic and 'Rabbits hop' is not analytic unless it is supplemented by an explanation of why the truth-functional implications from 1 to 3 and 4 and 5 to 6 and their corresponding logical truths which we may abbreviate as 'If 1 then 3 ' and 'If 4 and 5 , then 6 ' are themselves analytic or make no appeal to any extra-linguistic facts , whereas many obvious non-logical truths, such as 5 , are not analytic. Despite these problems, I think there is much to admire in Becker's book, especially its patient, detailed scrutiny of some of Quine's central writings and its aim of challenging Quine's arguments on their own terms. Here then is another place where Becker's understanding of Quine could have benefitted from a more detailed examination of the relationship between Quine's and Carnap's views. Becker argues in earlier sections of his last chapter that there is no significant indeterminacy of interpretation, so for any given natural language L there is only one empirically adequate theory of meaning for L. Did Carnap believe that logic is true by convention? The problem is that once you have gotten your nifty new product, the the themes of quine s philosophy becker edward gets a brief glance, maybe a once over, but it often tends to get discarded or lost with the original packaging.
He also proposes a new version of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, and a new way of rehabilitating analyticity. We can nevertheless coherently translate our word 'rabbit' by our phrase 'undetached rabbit part', if we also make appropriate compensatory adjustments in translations of other words. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. He offers detailed analyses of the relevant texts, discusses Quine's views on meaning, reference and knowledge, and shows how Quine's views developed over the years. If one hopes to provide a convincing naturalistic response to Quine, as Becker does Becker, p. It discusses the import of quantifier variance in the model theory of mathematics. In short, since the right-hand side of 1 , namely 2 , is a truth-functional logical truth, and 1 is a material biconditional, 1 truth-functionally implies 3.